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Author’s Introduction 
Mathematicians value and pursue proofs they consider explanatory, as opposed to 
those that merely verify a result without explaining it. This is philosophically 
interesting for at least two reasons. One is because we care about explanation: how 
does a proof explain a theorem, and what does this tell us about explanation in 
general? Another is because we care about mathematical practice: what kinds of 
proofs do mathematicians consider explanatory, and what does this tell us about how 
mathematics is done and why? The last twenty years has seen a surge of important 
work on explanatory proof; the article surveys some key recent developments. 
 
Author Recommends:  
 
Steiner, Mark. 1978. “Mathematical Explanation.”  Philosophical Studies 34, 135-151, DOI: 
10.1007/BF00354494.  
The paper that started the current wave of philosophical interest in mathematical explanation. Argues 
that a proof is explanatory when it exploits a “characterizing property” of an object mentioned in the 
theorem. Although Steiner’s theory isn’t currently popular, the paper has been much discussed and 
contains many important examples and ideas. 
 
Mancosu, Paolo. 2008. “Mathematical Explanation: Why It Matters.”  In Paolo Mancosu (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, Oxford University Press: New York, 134-150. 
A useful overview of some major topics, including historical and contemporary examples of explanation 
in mathematics, Steiner’s and Kitcher’s theories and their problems, and the relevance of mathematical 
explanation for Quine-style indispensability arguments. 
 
Lange, Marc. 2009. “Why Proofs by Mathematical Induction Are Generally Not Explanatory.”  
Analysis 69, 203-211, DOI: 10.1093/analys/anp002. 
A short, engaging and ingenious paper that’s produced a small literature on the explanatory value of 
induction proofs. 
 
Frans, Joachim and Erik Weber. 2014. “Mechanistic Explanation and Explanatory Proofs in 
Mathematics.”  Philosophia Mathematica 22, 231-248, DOI: 10.1093/philmat/nku003. 
Adapts “New Mechanist” ideas about interventions, mechanisms and explanation to analyze proofs of 
the Butterfly Theorem from Euclidean geometry. Useful for making connections with contemporary 
work on scientific explanation. 
 
Lange, Marc. 2014. “Aspects of Mathematical Explanation: Symmetry, Unity, and Salience.”  
Philosophical Review 123, 485-531, DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2749730. 
The most ambitious and sophisticated theory of mathematical explanation since Steiner. Argues that a 
proof is explanatory when its theorem exhibits a salient feature and the proof makes use of the same type 
of feature. Full of fascinating examples. 
 
Pincock, Christopher. 2015. “The Unsolvability of the Quintic: A Case Study in Abstract Mathematical 
Explanation.”  Philosophers’ Imprint 15, 1-19. 
An important attempt to connect explanatory proof with the idea that explanations require objective 
ontic dependence relations. 
 
D’Alessandro, William. 2019. “Viewing-as Explanations and Ontic Dependence.”  Philosophical 
Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-018-1205-5. 
Argues that some mathematical explanations don’t involve objective dependence relations, and hence 
the “ontic conception of explanation” isn’t adequate in general. The main examples are proofs that 
involve viewing one mathematical object as another. 
 
Inglis, Matthew and Juan Pablo Mejía-Ramos. 2019. “Functional Explanation in Mathematics.”  
Synthese, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02234-5. 
A novel systematic theory of explanatory proof. Argues that a proof is explanatory when it produces 
understanding, which in turn is identified with the creation of cognitive schemas and their consolidation 
in long-term memory. A valuable “epistemicist” contribution to the debate. 
Online Materials:  
2014 Mathematical Depth Workshop at the University of California-Irvine: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ityjwqFlXb0&list=PLQw7KTnzkpXfGo93vo3kQk7_jA_HgwbnC 
 
Talks by Andrew Arana, Mario Bonk, Bob Geroch, Jeremy Gray, Marc Lange, John Stillwell, Jamie 
Tappenden and Alasdair Urquhart, several of which deal with the relationship between depth and 
mathematical explanation. 
 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on explanation in mathematics, by Paolo Mancosu: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathematics-explanation/ 
 
Sample Syllabus: 
Week I: Introduction 
Mancosu, “Mathematical Explanation: Why It Matters” 
Lange, Marc. 2010. “What Are Mathematical Coincidences (and Why Does It Matter)?” Mind 119, 
307-340. 
 
Week II: Some History 
Detlefsen, Michael. 1988. “Fregean Hierarchies and Mathematical Explanation.” International Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science 3, 97-116. 
Mancosu, Paolo. 1999. “Bolzano and Cournot on Mathematical Explanation.” Revue d’Histoire des 
Sciences 52, 429-455. 
 
Week III: Skepticism about Mathematical Explanation 
Zelcer, Mark. 2013. “Against Mathematical Explanation.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 
44, 173-192. 
Weber, Erik and Joachim Frans. 2017. “Is Mathematics a Domain for Philosophers of Explanation?” 
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 48,125-142. 
 
Week IV: Steiner and His Critics 
Steiner, “Mathematical Explanation” 
Resnik, Michael D. and David Kushner. 1987. “Explanation, Independence and Realism in 
Mathematics.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38, 141-158. 
 
Week V: Lange’s Salience Theory 
Lange, “Aspects of Mathematical Explanation” 
 
Week VI: The Metaphysics of Explanatory Proof 
Pincock, “The Unsolvability of the Quintic” 
D’Alessandro, “Viewing-as Explanations and Ontic Dependence” 
Focus Questions  
1. Is there an explanatory proof for each and every mathematical fact? If not, why 
not, and what can we say about the exceptions? 
 
2. Mathematicians value proofs for lots of different reasons. Some important 
factors are beauty, depth, simplicity, surveyability, abstractness, generalizability, 
transparency, transferability, computer checkability and constructiveness. Are 
any of these qualities related in an interesting way to explanation? 
 
3. Many philosophers consider counterfactuals to be a useful tool for studying 
explanations in science. Can counterfactuals shed any light on the nature of 
explanatory proof? 
 
4. Since it was shown in the early 20th century that most of mathematics can be 
translated into the language of set theory, questions have arisen about what a 
“foundation for mathematics” should look like and whether set theory is up to 
the task. What’s the role of explanation here? Should we expect a foundational 
theory to yield explanatory proofs, and does set theory actually do so? 
 
5. Does it make sense to think of some proofs as being objectively, intrinsically 
explanatory? Or is explanatoriness always relative to a subject’s background 
knowledge, interests, cognitive capabilities, and other contextual factors?  
 
 
Seminar/Project Idea: 
 
If there’s one pieces of mathematics that almost everyone has seen a proof of, it’s the 
Pythagorean Theorem: the fact that 𝑎2 + 𝑏2 = 𝑐2, where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the legs of a 
right triangle and 𝑐 is the hypotenuse. The Pythagorean Theorem has many dozens 
(perhaps hundreds) of proofs, drawing on a variety of interestingly different ideas. 
Which type of proof is the most explanatory and why? For inspiration, you might start 
with Eli Maor, The Pythagorean Theorem: A 4,000-Year History (2007, Princeton 
University Press). 
